From Thucydides to Trump, “might makes right” still shapes foreign policy. The era of institutions is waning; the era of power again holds sway.

The aphorism asserts that having superior strength or power gives one the ability to control society and enforce one’s own agenda, beliefs, concepts of justice, and so on. Montague defined kratocracy as a government by those strong enough to seize control through violence or deceit.  Realist scholars of international politics use the phrase to describe the “state of nature” in which power determines the relations among sovereign states. 

That appears to be where we are today in geopolitical affairs.

The idea, though not the wording, has been attributed to the 5^th century BC historian Thucydides, who stated:

“right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

Today, even invoking international law has become tenuous. Institutions look increasingly impotent, if not irrelevant, as political and economic processes unfold demonstrably beyond their orbit of control.

The latest actors of initiatives that violate international law under UN auspices and other legal norms are states primarily of the US-led Western Alliance — the very countries that dominate the global economic and political information system. When similar violations affected others in the past, they were treated as regrettable but secondary. The blame was placed on the moral or political shortcomings of the countries involved, including the victims, rather than on a systemic crisis.

Today, the integrity of the system itself is palpably eroding.

The United States has not only discarded conventions of international norms, it has begun applying this approach to its own allies — European countries with whom it once treated as “democratic” equals, or at least as its trusted vassals. Decisions by the US are now made by diktat, as if by divine mandate. The result has been consternation in Western Europe, including accusations by the latter of betrayal.

Washington is dismantling the world order it helped build and led for more than eight decades, an order many have regarded as both self-centered in its development and short-sighted in its implementation. Since transatlantic ties formed the backbone of the liberal international system, revising them has become a priority for the US.

After the Cold War, the balance of power was clear. The US and its allies exercised dominance, enforced a single set of rules, and extracted the political and economic “rent” that came with global hegemony. But shifts in global power to Asia and the east as well as structural problems with the capitalist system of the G7 have reduced those benefits while increasing the costs of maintaining its hegemony.

The Biden administration represented an attempt to repair the old model. Its goal was to recreate an ideologically unified and politically invincible West capable of leading the rest of the world – through persuasion when possible, coercion when necessary. That effort failed.

Today, the new slogan is “peace through strength,” paired with “America First.” This approach is now enshrined in key doctrinal documents, including the US’s National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy. Power – not only military, but financial, technological and political – is placed at the center of foreign policy. The only real constraint involve the limits of America’s own capacity.

If the previous era was described as a “rules-based order,” the new moniker could be called an “initiative-based order.” Initiatives create precedents, and those precedents justify further actions. Of course, the precedents at least initially carry the weight of prerogatives of the United States. Others may behave similarly – but only when it suits Washington’s interests. The right of other states to act consistent with US precedents is not rejected on its face, but it is tolerated only when countries doing so are strong enough economically and politically and do not directly challenge US priorities.

This logic extends to allies, who now find themselves in an especially uncomfortable and unflattering position. Under the old system, they benefited greatly from American patronage. Chief among these benefits was the ability to minimize their own strategic spending by delegating responsibility for their security interests to the United States. Washington encouraged this arrangement because it perpetuated the functioning of the global order it led.

Today, what was once portrayed as mutually beneficial partnerships are increasingly viewed in the US as unrequited friendship and an unprofitable subsidy. Washington wants to recoup past costs and avoid future economic and military burdens. This abrupt shift has shocked America’s allies, but from a strictly material perspective, the reasoning is far from irrational. Even a future change of US administration is unlikely to reverse this basic reassessment of alliances.

Against the backdrop of this geopolitical landscape, Donald Trump’s Board of Peace solemnly announced in Davos can perhaps be dismissed as his personal (not necessarily the US’s) long-term agenda. Yet, in today’s world defined by power, those who lack it must compensate for it by offering something to those who have it.

The most tangible and thus effective offering to the Gaza initiative is financial tribute; hence, the billion-dollar global contributions. If that is too costly, enthusiastic displays of loyalty by sycophants may suffice. Membership in such a body appears to function as a form of political insurance: protection from the chairman’s displeasure, because today — “might makes right.”

For large, independent powers, participation is almost impossible. A structure in which rights are explicitly limited by the founder’s will, and where procedures remain unclear, contradicts the very idea of sovereignty. Whether or not the Executive Council works in practice is secondary. Its symbolic meaning is clear: recognition of the White House’s supremacy.

The Trump administration understands that the world has changed and it is searching for ways to preserve, or even expand, American hegemony. Other major players in the emerging multipolar order must do the same, but in their own interests and according to their own logic.

If Washington openly advocates rational egoism grounded in raw power, others have little reason not to coalesce around multipolar efforts to protect their sovereignty with their own global initiatives.

*

Click the share button below to email/forward this article. Follow us on Instagram and X and subscribe to our Telegram Channel. Feel free to repost Global Research articles with proper attribution.

F. Andrew Wolf, Jr. is director of The Fulcrum Institute, a new organization of current and former scholars, which engages in research and commentary, focusing on political and cultural issues on both sides of the Atlantic. After service in the USAF (Lt.Col.-Intel) Dr. Wolf obtained a PhD-philosophy (Wales), MA-theology (Univ. S. Africa), MTh-philosophical theology (TCU-Brite Div.). He taught philosophy, humanities and theology in the US and S. Africa before retiring from university.

He is a regular contributor to Global Research.

Global Research is a reader-funded media. We do not accept any funding from corporations or governments. Help us stay afloat. Click the image below to make a one-time or recurring donation.