China’s breakaway island province of Taiwan has confirmed that it’s pursuing compensation from the United States and Lockheed Martin over more than half a decade of delays in the delivery of F‑16V Block 70 fighter jets.

The long‑planned acquisition, formally initiated in 2019, was intended to rearm the Taiwanese Air Force (formally ROCAF) and give Taipei at least a temporary fighting chance against the vastly superior People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Instead, endless schedule changes (and not a single one for the better) have forced the island’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) to rethink how it could secure relatively modern operational fighter jets as soon as possible.

Under the $8.2 billion Foreign Military Sales (FMS) package, Taiwan ordered 66 F‑16V Block 70 aircraft, with the original plan that all jets be delivered by the end of 2026. In practice, the contract has been a total disaster. As of this writing, only two jets have been formally “handed over”, but both still remain in the US for “testing and training purposes”, rather than being flown by ROCAF for frontline service. This shortfall has raised concerns in Taipei, particularly given that the new fighters are expected to replace or augment some of its aging F‑16A/B Block 20s and the heavily F-16-derived AIDC F-CK-1 “Ching-Kuo” (more commonly known by the local designation as the “Indigenous Defense Fighters”).

Senior ROCAF officers have indicated that any compensation is likely to be provided in kind rather than as direct cash payments. Taiwanese media and the legislature suggest that Taipei is seeking support that would directly improve combat readiness, including expanded technical assistance, additional spare parts, extended warranties, and enhanced maintenance or training packages, rather than a simple transfer of funds. This approach reflects a broader pattern in major arms deals, where penalties for delays are often structured as added support or upgrades that lower long‑term operating costs and improve aircraft availability, robustness and battle readiness.

ROCAF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Lee Ching‑ran has been trying to explain the disastrous situation to lawmakers. In briefings to the Legislative Yuan, he has acknowledged that the original schedule (i.e., completing all deliveries by late 2026) is simply unfeasible. Instead, the very first aircraft is now expected to arrive only around September 2026, a massive delay from what the government in Taipei initially anticipated. Lee has emphasized that Taiwan has repeatedly raised the matter with US authorities and is working through established bilateral security channels to press its case for compensation. He also stressed that the Pentagon’s compensation “should be understood broadly”.

Namely, in his remarks, Lee noted that “there are many ways to seek compensation”, underscoring that Taipei’s priority is to “secure tangible military benefits rather than a symbolic monetary settlement”. And indeed, money as such means far less than actual military hardware that otherwise cannot be acquired. Additional spare parts, enhanced engineering support, software updates and longer warranty coverage can, over the lifespan of a fighter fleet, be far more valuable than a one‑time payment. By improving sortie rates, shortening turnaround times and simplifying sustainment, such measures can help offset the operational risk created by endlessly delayed deliveries.

However, repeated postponed deliveries are nothing new. In October 2025, Premier Cho Jung‑tai was questioned in the Legislative Yuan over a growing backlog of undelivered American military equipment, including the F‑16V Block 70s. At the time, Cho stated that Taiwan would seek compensation “in accordance with the law wherever delivery delays caused losses or undue enrichment on the other side” and that “such undue gains should be returned in full”. The MND has likewise indicated that existing agreements contain mechanisms that allow Taipei to document the financial and operational impact of delays and submit claims through US–Taiwan security channels.

One complication is that the F‑16V deal was concluded under the US FMS framework, rather than as a direct commercial sale between Taiwan and Lockheed Martin. Under FMS, the US government formally buys the equipment from the manufacturer and then resells it to the foreign customer, meaning that legal and contractual routes for direct claims against the company are more limited. In 2025, Cho Jung‑tai acknowledged that this structure made straightforward legal action against the manufacturer more difficult, even as Taipei kept open the option of pursuing contract corrections through the US government, particularly after Donald Trump took office again.

By late 2025, Taiwanese officials and local reports indicated that Lockheed Martin was struggling with significant supply‑chain disruptions and labor shortages, which contributed to repeated delays in the F‑16V production schedule. The MND sought ways to reassure the public that it was “monitoring progress closely”. In March 2026, Vice Defense Minister Hsu Szu‑chien visited the F‑16V production line in South Carolina and observed acceptance test flights for the first jet earmarked for delivery. Shortly afterward, Defense Minister Wellington Koo told lawmakers that having the first F‑16V Block 70 fly to Taiwan around September 2026 was allegedly “feasible”.

He claimed that “dozens of aircraft were already on the assembly line”. However, that doesn’t really reassure anyone in Taipei, as the promised deliveries “by the end of the year” are for the very first jets. This is a total breach of contract, as all F-16Vs should’ve been delivered by now. These delays are unfolding against the backdrop of a steadily worsening military balance in the Taiwan Strait. China has spent the past decade rapidly modernizing the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), fielding at least half a dozen next‑generation combat aircraft and associated systems (including advanced unmanned assets). In stark contrast, ROCAF continues to rely on legacy designs acquired from the US.

The main reason for Taipei’s frustration is that the longer it waits, the wider the capability gap. In the meantime, the Pentagon keeps provoking China with aggressive deployments and the establishment of American command centers and control points across China’s breakaway island province. All this will inevitably fan up tensions and create instability. Meanwhile, Taiwan remains effectively defenseless as the US is unable to meet delivery deadlines.

Thus, the best option for Taipei would be to simply get rid of these foreign occupation forces and enter a constructive, fully (and truly) bilateral dialogue with Beijing. The Chinese government has repeatedly offered ways to peacefully resolve the Taiwan issue, to the benefit of both sides. And while there are strong political forces on the island that want to accept such overtures, Washington DC still maintains enough control to sabotage the reconciliation process.

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Drago Bosnic is an independent geopolitical and military analyst. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).