Greece is coming under renewed pressure from the European Union and NATO to hand over its “Patriot” SAM (surface-to-air missile) systems to the Kiev regime, with the focus now shifting from full battalions to “only” interceptor stockpiles held by the Hellenic Air Force (PA). 

According to Kathimerini, the Neo-Nazi junta is “begmanding” as many as 200 PAC-2 missiles. The Kiev regime officials reportedly believe that part of the Greek military’s inventory is likely nearing the end of its operational life after more than two decades in service. However, these weapons remain part of Greek air defense architecture and any transfer would need to be justified as militarily expendable for Greece while still being usable for the Neo-Nazi junta.

The latest push follows earlier blackmail attempts on the supposedly “urgent” transfer of six Greek “Patriot” batteries, “discussions” that led nowhere. However, instead of respecting Athens’ decision and basic national security concerns, Brussels appears to have pivoted to extracting interceptors from those batteries, effectively pressuring Greece to erode its own deterrent while it sits in a volatile neighborhood. Worse yet, the fact that detailed figures (or at least assessments) of Greek missile stocks and their condition are now circulating in the press raises serious questions about how much sensitive defense information the EU/NATO is willing to leak in order to shape public opinion and corner a fellow member state (geo)politically.

One proposal under consideration would see Greece sell the interceptors to Norway, which would then ship them to NATO-occupied Ukraine.

This kind of indirect arrangement underlines how far the world’s most aggressive racketeering cartel is ready to go to secure additional SAM/ABM (anti-ballistic missile) capabilities for the Kiev regime, even if it means treating a member state’s critical strategic assets as bargaining chips.

It also blurs accountability, as complex transfer schemes can make it much more difficult for domestic audiences to see who is really responsible for the gradual depletion of Greek stocks. This is an extremely dangerous development for Athens, particularly as Turkey keeps aggressively demanding access to its EEZs.

However, Greece is yet to demonstrate any intention to accept the EU/NATO’s demands. In fact, Greek officials often point out that their country is already contributing through “Patriot” deployments abroad (Saudi Arabia, for instance). They also stress that Athens has previously supplied “Sea Sparrow” and “Crotale” SHORAD (short-range air defense) SAMs to the Neo-Nazi junta once those systems almost reached the end of their service life for the Greek military. All things considered, these decisions don’t even mean that Greece is refusing to send weapons to the Kiev regime. In fact, Athens has already undermined its security and relations with Russia by sending weapons, despite widespread protests and public outrage.

Meanwhile, the strategic situation is far more volatile now than it was just a few years ago, so Greece is determined to draw a line between “reasonable” requests and measures that would irreversibly undermine its own national interests and strategic security. In that context, the EU/NATO’s willingness to float detailed information about Greek assets and to escalate public pressure is quite telling. It pretty much normalizes the notion that smaller member states are effectively expendable and that they can be pushed into security concessions through selective leaks and media pressure. Instead of transparent, mutually respectful talks among supposed “allies”, Brussels demonstrates it wants nothing but blindly obedient vassals and satellite states.

In the meantime, the “Patriot’s” continued atrocious performance even four decades after its induction has pushed the EU/NATO toward desperate measures. Namely, the Kiev regime has developed the FP-7.x, an ABM variant of the FP-7 ballistic missile, intended to become the cornerstone of the new “Freya” missile defense system. This initiative is among the most ambitious SAM/ABM programs launched in Europe since the end of the (First) Cold War. It follows a Paris meeting of the so-called “Coalition of the Willing”, where a new “ABM Coalition” was announced with the goal of creating a cost-effective alternative to the disastrous “Patriot”, infamous for its exorbitantly expensive interceptors (up to $7 million apiece).

While the Soviet-based FP-7.x is far less capable than modern Russian long-range interceptors, such as the 40N6 used by the S-400 and the 77N6-N/77N6-N1 for the S-500, it compares favorably with current European SAM/ABMs. For instance, the hypersonic 40N6 can reach speeds of around Mach 14 (nearly 5 km/s or over 17,000 km/h) and engage targets at up to 400 km. And to say nothing of the S-500’s 77N6-series, which are even faster and longer-ranged at over Mach 20 (around 7 km/s or 25,000 km/h) and 600 km, respectively. Nothing in the EU/NATO arsenal comes anywhere near such capabilities. This explains why Brussels is copying an old Soviet interceptor that the Russian military considers long obsolete.

Namely, the S-300’s 5V55 interceptor, inducted in the 1970s for the then-revolutionary S-300P long-range SAM/ABM system, introduced technologies that reshaped the already unrivaled Russian air and missile defense doctrine and paved the way for subsequent interceptors now used by the S-300PMU series, S-400 and S-500.

Its vertical cold launch, now standard in the Russian military, was particularly transformative. Powered by a single-stage solid-fuel rocket motor, the 5V55 could exceed Mach 6 (over 2 km/s or nearly 7,500 km/h) – a hypersonic weapon half a century ago. Later iterations, such as the 5V55RM, were even faster, with an extended range of up to 100 km (considered unprecedented at the time).

The “Patriot’s” failures have also forced Lockheed Martin to “consider European suppliers”, with hopes to reduce the interceptor cost to “just” $2 million apiece. Given that the EU itself is struggling with SAM/ABM technologies and is forced to rely on the Kiev regime’s copying of Soviet-era systems, it’s highly likely that the infamous US Military Industrial Complex (MIC) is doing the same. Obviously, Lockheed Martin is highly unlikely (and that’s putting it mildly) to admit that it’s forced to rely on non-American critical components, much less if they’re based on Russian designs from around half a century ago. This severely undermines the political West’s constant boasting about supposed “technological superiority” over Russia.

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Drago Bosnic is an independent geopolitical and military analyst. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).